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CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - SELF-INCRIM-
INATION - COURT MAY COMPEL WITNESSES TO TESTIFY 
BEFORE A GRAND JURY WHO ARE IMMUNE FROM PROSE-
CUTION IN THE UNITED STATES, BUT AMENABLE TO PROS-
ECUTION IN A FOREIGN JURISDICTION. United States v. Under 
Seal, 794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 331 (1986). 
Irene and Gregorio Araneta, the daughter and son-in-law of Ferdi-
nand E. Marcos, former President of the Philippines, were lawfully pres-
ent in the United States under advanced parole status.! A grand jury, 
while investigating possible corruption involving arms contracts with the 
Philippines, subpoenaed the Aranetas to testify2 and granted them im-
munity from prosecution in the United States.3 The Aranetas refused, 
however, to testify before the grand jury because they alleged that a real 
and substantial risk existed4 that their testimony could be used to incrim-
inate them in the Philippines.s Subsequently, the district court held the 
Aranetas in contempt for refusing to comply with the subpoena.6 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the con-
tempt order and refused to extend the fifth amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination to the Aranetas even though their testimony could be 
used in a foreign prosecution. 7 
The fifth amendment provides, "[n]o person ... shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... "8 This right 
prohibits a court from compelling a person's testimony if it may be used 
against him in a domestic criminal proceeding by either federal or state 
1. United States v. Under Seal, 794 F.2d 920, 922 (4th Cir.), cerr. denied, 107 S. Ct. 
331 (1986). Advanced parole status was granted pursuant to 8 U.S.c. § 1182(d)(5) 
(1982). This statute empowers the Attorney General to admit aliens temporarily 
into the United States in the event of an emergency or for reasons considered to be 
strictly in the public interest. Parole is not regarded as an admission of the alien and 
when the purposes of the parole have been served, the alien shall return to the cus-
tody from which he was paroled. [d. n.2. 
2. Under Seal, 794 F.2d at 927. 
3. The immunity grant supersedes their fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation in the United States. [d. at 923. Immunity from prosecution may be granted 
to a witness in exchange for testimony under state or federal statutes. Protection 
from prosecution must be commensurate with the fifth amendment privilege, but 
the protection need not be any greater. Therefore, a person is constitutionally guar-
anteed protection only from prosecution based on the use and derivative use of his 
testimony, and not from prosecution for everything arising from the illegal transac-
tion which his testimony concerns. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 
459-62 (1972). 
4. The factors which created a real and substantial risk of foreign prosecution were an 
extradition treaty between the United States and the Philippines was awaiting Sen-
ate approval, and the expressed American policy to aid and assist the Aquino gov-
ernment in its pursuit of Philippine interests regarding the Marcos regime. Under 
Seal, 794 F.2d at 923-24. 
5. Shortly after their arrival, the Solicitor General of the Philippines charged the 
Aranetas with conspiracy, violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 
and violations of Articles 210-221 of the Philippines Penal Code. [d. at 922. 
6. [d. at 921. 
7. !d. at 928. 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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officials.9 This privilege against self-incrimination may be superseded by 
a grant of immunity made pursuant to an immunity statute. \0 A grant of 
immunity protects the individual from self-incrimination within the 
scope of the fifth amendment privilege, and thus, enables a court to com-
pel testimony without violating the privilege. I I 
Prior to a trial, the grand jury may compel a witness to testify pur-
suant to its investigative role in the criminal justice process. 12 The wit-
ness may invoke his fifth amendment privilege before the grand jury, 
when the compelled testimony causes a real and substantial threat of 
criminal liability. 13 When the testimony may be necessary to the public 
interest, the prosecutor may obtain a court order granting immunity.14 
The grant of immunity forces the witness to either testify or face con-
tempt sanctions. IS 
The constitutional prohibition contained in the fifth amendment did 
not at first apply to the states,16 and the Supreme Court, in applying the 
privilege against self-incrimination, treated the federal government and 
the states as independent sovereigns for purposes of this fifth amendment 
privilege. 17 For example, the fifth amendment protection did not pro-
hibit the federal government from compelling testimony, through a grant 
of immunity, that would incriminate a witness under state law. ls Fur-
thermore, the privilege did not protect testimony compelled on the state 
level that would incriminate under federal law. 19 
The Court, however, extended the fifth amendment privilege against 
9. See Note, The Reach of the Fifth Amendment Privilege When Domestically Com· 
pelled Testimony May Be Used in a Foreign Country's Court, 69 VA. L. REV. 875, 
882 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Reach of the Fifth Amendment). 
10. In 1892, the Supreme Court, in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), 
considered for the first time a constitutional challenge to an immunity statute. The 
Court held that an immunity statute, in order to satisfy the requirements of the fifth 
amendment, must provide either absolute immunity or transactional immunity 
against future prosecution for an offense. In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 
(1972), the Court narrowed the effect of the Counselman holding by concluding that 
transactional immunity afforded a broader protection than the fifth amendment 
privilege required, and that use and derivative use immunity would provide protec-
tion commensurate with the fifth amendment privilege. 
11. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 143 (3d ed. 1984); see also W. 
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 23.3(f) (1985) (in addition to the 
grand jury, a trial court may grant immunity to a defense witness during a criminal 
trial). 
12. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 11, § 8.1. The grand jury decides whether to 
issue an indictment by reviewing the government's evidence, and, in effect, screening 
the prosecutor's decision to charge. 
13. Id. § 8.10. 
14. Id. § 8.11(c). 
15.Id. 
16. See Note, Reach of the Fifth Amendment, supra note 9, at 879. 
17. This is also known as the "two sovereignties rule." See Grant, Federalism and Self-
Incrimination,S UCLA L. REV. 1 (1958). 
18. See United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 
(1906); Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905). 
19. Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958). 
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self-incrimination to the states through the fourteenth amendment.2o 
Later, in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission ,21 the Court held that the 
fifth amendment privilege protects a state witness from prosecution 
under federal and state law if the compelled testimony or its fruits could 
be used in any manner by federal officials in comiection with a criminal 
prosecution against him.22 The Court also indicated, in dicta, that the 
privilege would protect a federal witness from prosecution under federal 
or state law23 and that the privilege against self-incrimination may pro-
tect a witness facing prosecution from a foreign sovereign.24 In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court relied on the English rule that protects a wit-
ness from answering questions about acts that are cognizable in a foreign 
jurisdiction.25 
After Murphy, the Court in Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission 
of Investigation 26 was faced with the issue of whether the fifth amend-
ment precludes the compulsion of testimony from a witness who risks 
foreign prosecution. The Court outlined the framework of analysis to be 
used in deciding whether to extend the privilege to witnesses facing for-
eign prosecution.27 First, a court must determine whether the witness 
faces a real and substantial risk of foreign prosecution as opposed to only 
a remote and speculative danger of such prosecution.28 If the risk is real 
and substantial, the court must address the constitutional issue.29 Be-
cause the Court found that the witness did not face a real and substantial 
20. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
21. 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
22. [d. at 77-79; see also Note, Reach of the Fifth Amendment, supra note 9, at 882 
("Thus the Murphy Court erased the fifth amendment line between state and federal 
criminal prosecutions. "). 
23. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 78. 
24. [d. at 63. 
25. [d. English courts had recognized before the United States Constitution was 
adopted that the privilege against self-incrimination protects a witness from being 
compelled to testify if such testimony could be used against him in another jurisdic-
tion. [d. at 58 (citing East India Co. v. Campbell, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (1749»; see 
also Brownsword v. Edwards, 28 Eng. Rep. 157 (1750) (recognizing the right 
against self-incrimination). An earlier English opinion, cited as the settled English 
rule in United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931), refused to apply the self-
incrimination privilege to a former Sicilian revolutionary who feared foreign incrim-
ination. Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (1851). United States v. McRae, 
3 L.R. - Ch. App. 79 (1867), however, overruled Willcox. Because of the close 
connection between the English and American right against self-incrimination, and 
the absence of definite American authority on the subject, the English rule has been 
an important guide in interpreting the scope of the fifth amendment privilege. Com-
ment, Fear of Foreign Prosecution and the Fifth Amendment, 58 IOWA L. REV. 
1304, 1307 (1973) [hereinafter Comment, Fear of Foreign Prosecution]. 
26. 406 U.S. 472 (1972). The holding in Zicarelli is based on the test set forth in Hoff-
man v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951). Under the Hoffman test, the privilege 
prohibited compelling any testimony that would "furnish [even] a link in the chain 
of evidence needed to prosecute .... " [d. at 486. 
27. [d. at 480-81. 
28. [d. at 478. 
29. [d. 
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risk of foreign prosecution, the Court was not confronted with the consti-
tutional issue. 30 
In In re Cardassi ,31 the court considered whether a witness who was 
granted immunity may successfully invoke the fifth amendment privilege 
based upon the fear of foreign prosecution. 32 The government argued 
that strict judicial controls against disclosure of testimony given at a 
grand jury hearing provided by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) 
(the secrecy rule) alleviates the need for the fifth amendment protec-
tion. 33 Using the Zicarelli framework of analysis, the Cardassi court de-
termined that the witness's fear of foreign prosecution was reasonable, 
and thus proceeded to address the constitutional issue left open in Zi-
carelli. 34 The court acknowledged that while the secrecy rule limits the 
danger of foreign prosecution, the rule has faults and exceptions that 
allow disclosure. 35 Therefore, the court concluded that the privilege 
against self-incrimination protects an immunized witness in American 
courts from self-incrimination in foreign jurisdictions when a court deter-
mines that the witness' fear of foreign prosecution is reasonable. 36 The 
court noted that preservation of the fifth amendment privilege is consis-
tent with the English rule,37 which it interpreted as protecting a witness 
30. Id. at 480-81. 
31. 3S I F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972). 
32. /d. at 1083. 
33. Id. at 1082. 
34. Id. at 1084. 
3S. Id. at 1082-83. Exceptions to the grand jury secrecy rule include: 
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule ... may be made to 
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of 
such attorney's duty; and 
(ii) such government personnel as are deemed necessary ... to assist 
an attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty 
* * * (C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited ... may also be made -
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection 
with the judicial proceeding; or 
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant .... 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(c)(3). 
Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure gives judges broad discre-
tion over the disclosure of grand jury records. Because the secrecy rule does not 
usually apply after the grand jury has been dismissed, courts are more liberal in 
allowing the secrecy to be breached. Government attorneys have access to the tran-
scripts. Because the transcripts are often used to impeach, attack credibility, or 
refresh memory, the testimony often becomes part of the public record and is avail-
able to all. Furthermore, the secrecy rule does not cover any physical evidence 
uncovered directly or indirectly due to the grand jury testimony. Additionally, 18 
U.S.c. § 3333 (1970) permits reports to a grand jury to become part of the public 
record if so desired by a majority of the grand jurors. 
36. In re Cardassi, 3S I F. Supp. 1080, 1084-86 (D. Conn. 1972). 
37. The court relied on Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. S2 (1964), as having 
formally adopted the English rule. Cardassi at 1084-86. The English rule, as stated 
in United States v. McRae, 3 L.R. Ch. App. 79 (1867) has been interpreted by some 
courts as authority for extending the fifth amendment to foreign prosecutions. 
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against testifying if such testimony could lead to foreign incrimination.38 
Other courts that have considered whether the fifth amendment ap-
plies to foreign prosecutions have reached different results.39 For exam-
ple, in Phoenix Assurance Co. of Canada v. Runck,4{) the court flatly 
rejected the English rule and refused to extend the fifth amendment privi-
lege.41 The court noted that because the United States Constitution was 
written before the English decided any foreign incrimination cases, the 
English rule would not have had any influence over the framers of the 
Constitution.42 Furthermore, the court also indicated that the fifth 
amendment governs only domestic affairs because constitutional protec-
tions apply only to those governments ruled by the United States Consti-
tution unless expressly stated otherwise.43 The court stated that "if the 
privilege were to apply to foreign prosecution it would frustrate the effec-
tive use of granting immunity in exchange for testimony."44 Lastly, the 
court implied that extending the privilege would unduly burden domestic 
courts with questions of foreign law which they are unqualified to 
answer.45 
United States v. Flanagan 46 represents a compromise between the 
opposing views on the extension of the fifth amendment to foreign prose-
cutions.47 The Flanagan court recognized, as did the Cardassi court, 
that because the secrecy rule does not always eliminate the risk of a for-
eign prosecution, the right to refuse to testify should be granted in some 
38. Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080. Accord In re Flanagan, 533 F. Supp. 957, 965 
(E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982); Mishima v. United 
States, 507 F. Supp. 131, 135 (D. Alaska 1981); In re Letters Rogatory, 448 F. 
Supp. 786 (S.D. Fla. 1978). ' 
39. Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Runck, 317 N.W.2d 402 (N.D.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
862 (1982); In re Flanagan, 533 F. Supp. 957 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 
691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972). 
40. 317 N.W.2d 402 (N.D.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862 (1982). 
41. Phoenix Assurance Co., 317 N.W.2d at 413 (defend'ants feared prosecution for insur-
ance fraud in Canada). 
42. Id. at 411; see also Note, Reach of the Fifth Amendment, supra note 9, at 894. 
43. Phoenix Assurance Co. at 411; accord In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969), 
vacated and remanded as moot sub nom., Parker V. United States, 397 U.S. 96 
(1970); see also Rosado V. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1189 (2d Cir. 1980) ("the Bill of 
Rights . . . does not and cannot protect our citizens from the acts of a foreign 
sovereign committed within its territory"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856 (1980). Be-
cause the fifth amendment does not prohibit foreign sovereigns from using domesti-
cally compelled testimony in their own courts, neither the federal government nor 
the states would violate the privilege by compelling testimony that foreign sover-
eigns might use independently. See Note, Reach of the Fifth Amendment, supra note 
9, at 895. 
44. Phoenix Assurance Co., 317 N.W.2d at 412. 
45. /d. at 411. 
46. 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982). 
47. Compare Phoenix Assurance Co., 317 N. W.2d 402 (fifth amendment does not apply 
to foreign prosecutions) with In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972) 
(fifth amendment applies to foreign prosecutions where witness shows a "reason-
able" risk of foreign prosecution). 
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situations.48 In order to use the privilege against self-incrimination, how-
ever, the court required that claimants show a "real and substantial" risk 
of foreign prosecution,49 as opposed to a mere "reasonable" risk pro-
posed in Cardassi.50 The court implied that if the reasonable standard in 
Cardassi were the standard, the fifth amendment would become a license 
to frustrate most criminal investigations having any international conse-
quences. 51 Thus, the real and substantial standard in Flanagan repre-
sents a balance between two policies: 1) that individuals should not be 
compelled to incriminate themselves, and 2) that the public has a right to 
every person's evidence. 52 
In United States v. Under Seal,53 the court applied the Zicarelli anal-
ysis and determined that the Aranetas faced a real and substantial risk of 
prosecution in the Philippines. 54 Because of the wide public interest gen-
erated by the case,55 the court then reasoned that the protective order 
and grant of immunity did not adequately reduce the possibility of in-
advertant disclosure so as to render inconsequential the risk that the 
Aranetas' grand jury testimony would be used against them in the Philip-
pines. 56 The court determined, therefore, that it was required to address 
48. United States v. Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 1982). 
49. [d. at 124 (standard must be applied on a case-by-case basis). 
50. Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. at 1084-86. 
51. Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 121, 124. While avoiding formally addressing the constitu-
tional issue because this "greater-than-ordinary" standard was not met, the court 
appeared to assume the fifth amendment would protect a witness against foreign 
incrimination. The court also noted that the danger of grand jury leaks must be 
measured on a case-by-case basis. [d. at 124. 
52. [d. at 121. 
53. 794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 331 (1986). 
54. The factors used in determining the existence of a cognizable danger of foreign pros-
ecution of an individual include: 
Whether there is an existing or potential foreign prosecution of him; 
what foreign charges could be filed against him; whether prosecution of 
them would be initiated or furthered by his testimony; whether any such 
charges would entitle the foreign jurisdiction to have him extradited from 
the United States; and whether there is a likelihood that his testimony 
given here would be disclosed to the foreign government. 
/d. at 923-24 (citing United States v. Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 1982». 
The Philippine government had begun a prosecution against the Aranetas on 
charges related to the grand jury investigation. Although the Aranetas were at that 
time, in the United States, they could have voluntarily or involuntarily returned to 
the Philippines. First, an extradition treaty between the United States and the Phil-
ippines was awaiting Senate approval. Secondly, the Aranetas' continued stay in the 
United States was wholly within the discretion of the Attorney General who could 
have revoked this right at any time. Overlying both of these factors was the ex-
pressed policy of the United States to aid and assist the Aquino government in its 
pursuit of the Philippine interests regarding the Marcos regime. 
55. Under Seal, 794. F.2d at 925. The allegations against the Marcos family and the 
importance of the Philippine-American relations gave rise to an unusual degree of 
public interest. 
56. Pursuant to Fn;. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), the order sealed the notes and records of the 
Aranetas' testimony and allowed release only upon court order. Access to testi-
mony was limited to eight federal prosecutorial officials who were ordered not to 
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the constitutional issue of whether to extend the fifth amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination to witnesses at risk of foreign 
prosecution. 57 
The Under Seal court concluded that the fifth amendment privilege 
should apply only when both the sovereign compelling the testimony and 
the sovereign potentially using the testimony are restrained by the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 58 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
analogized to cases that involved the extension of the fifth amendment to 
prosecutions under state law, both before and after the fifth amendment 
was held applicable to the states. 59 In addition, the court considered the 
policy reasons supporting the right against self-incrimination, and found 
that non-extension of the fifth amendment would not imperil these val-
ues.60 The court reasoned that if the United States was prevented from 
using evidence legitimately within its possession merely because another 
sovereign could use the evidence in a way not permitted under American 
laws, then "our own national sovereignty would be compromised if our 
system of criminal justice were made to depend on the actions of foreign 
government [sic] beyond our control."61 
The court, in reaching its conclusion, also relied on a line of cases 
holding that the fifth amendment protects a witness against only such 
uses of his compelled testimony specifically proscribed by the fifth 
amendment, which does not prohibit the use of testimony in foreign pros-
ecutions.62 Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that Murphy 
provides authority in favor of extending the fifth amendment to foreign 
disclose any portion to another person or any foreign government. The government 
must keep specific records of all releases. The order required punishment for any 
violation to be contempt of court. Under Seal, 794 F.2d at 924-25. The court also 
found the order inadequate because it only protected against disclosure of testi-
mony, not evidence derived from such testimony. Id. at 925. The court also recog-
nized the possibility that inadvertent disclosure could have occurred. Id. If the 
Aranetas testified before the grand jury, they eventually could have been called as 
witnesses at trial. 
57. Id. at 925. 
58. Id. at 926. 
59. Id.; see also supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. 
60. Under Seal 794 F.2d at 926. The court described the values and aspirations under-
lying the fifth amendment as follows: 
Our unwi11ingness to subject those suspected of a crime to the cruel 
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an 
accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our 
fear that self-incriminating statements wi11 be elicited by inhumane treat-
ment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates 'a fair state-individ-
ual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until 
good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government 
in its context with the individual to shoulder the entire load.' 
Id. (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (citations 
omitted». 
61. Id. at 926. 
62. Id. at 927 (citing Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559-61 (1961); Brown v. 
Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597-98 (1896); Ryan v. Comm'r, 568 F.2d 531, 541-42 (7th 
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978); In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469 (7th Cir.), 
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prosecutions.63 The Under Seal court reasoned that the Supreme Court's 
dicta in Murphy was partially based on a questionable interpretation of 
the English rule; furthermore, the dicta conflicts with the current English 
law.64 In conclusion, the Under Seal court rejected the reasoning used to 
support the dicta in Murphy and refused to extend the fifth amendment 
right against self-incrimination to foreign prosecutions.6s 
The holding in Under Seal represents a well-reasoned and justified 
position,66 however, the court may have viewed the fifth amendment too 
narrowly.67 The court failed to address the policy implications of its 
holding and alternative methods of resolving this issue of whether to ex-
tend the fifth amendment to foreign prosecutions. Fear of foreign in-
crimination may force witnesses to choose among perjury, self-accusation 
or contempt. 68 Furthermore, the Under Seal holding conflicts somewhat 
with the desire embodied in the fifth amendment, to protect human dig-
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Childs v. McCord, 420 F. Supp. 428 (D. Md. 
1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 1178 (4th Cir. 1977». 
63. Under Seal, 794 F.2d at 927. Murphy, in dicta, had noted that the fifth amendment 
may apply to foreign prosecutions. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 62-63. 
64. Under Seal, 794 F.2d at 927. The Civil Evidence Act reads in pertinent part: 
The right of a person in any legal proceedings other than criminal 
proceedings to refuse to answer any question or produce any document or 
thing if to do so would tend to expose that person to proceedings for an 
offense or for the recovery of a penalty ... shall apply only as regards 
criminal offenses under the law of any part of the United Kingdom and 
penalties provided for by such law. 
Civil Evidence Act, 1968 § 14 (quoted in Note, Reach of the Fifth Amendment, 
supra note 9, at 894 n.118). Furthermore, the court in Under Seal recognized that 
the Supreme Court has never held that the fifth amendment applies to foreign prose-
cutions. Under Seal, 794 F.2d at 927; see also Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm 'n 
of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 481 (1972). 
65. Under Seal, 794 F.2d at 927. 
66. Under Seal aligns itself with the Tenth Circuit's decision in In re Parker, 411 F.2d 
1067 (10th Cir. 1969), vacated sub nom. Parker v. United States, 397 U.S. 96 (1970). 
The Tenth Circuit is the only other circuit that has addressed this issue. The only 
state court to address this issue reached the same conclusion. Phoenix Assurance 
Co. v. Runck, 317 N.W.2d 402 (N.D.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862 (1982). Under 
Seal is also supported by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) which 
advocated broad power to compel testimony. Three district court decisions support 
the opposite position, yet those decisions have never been followed in their respec-
tive circuits. See Mishima v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 131 (D. Alaska 1981) (9th 
Cir.); United States v. Trucis, 89 F.R.D. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (3rd Cir.); In re 
Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972) (2nd Cir.). 
67. The protection of the fifth amendment may be weakened or even disappear under 
the Under Seal type analysis, especially due to international cooperation in crime 
prevention. See Comment, Fear of Foreign Prosection, supra note 25, at 1322. Fur-
thermore, such a severe erosion of the fifth amendment would create an illusory 
immunity which conflicts with the American legal tradition of due process. See 
Note, The Fifth Amendment Does Not Protect Federal Grand Jury Witnesses from 
Being C;:ompelled to Give Testimony Which Would Incriminate Them in a Foreign 
Jurisdiction, 8 TEX. INT'L L.J. 262, 270 (1973) [hereinafter Note, The Fifth Amend-
ment Does Not Protect]. 
68. Note, Testimony Incriminating Under the Laws of a Foreign Country - Is There a 
Right to Remain Silent?, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 359, 365-66 (1978). 
194 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 17 
nity, which should prevent the sovereign from compelling someone to aid 
in the establishment of his own guilt.69 Forcing a witness in fear of for-
eign incrimination to give testimony that would incriminate himself 
under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction, however, conflicts with this 
American legal tradition of due process.70 
On the other hand, if the court had decided to extend the privilege, 
its holding could have unnecessarily tied the hands of the United States 
government and law enforcement officers, thereby denying American in-
vestigating officials access to evidence legitimately within their reach.71 
Moreover, American officials could lose their power to trade immunity in 
American courts for needed testimony because American courts cannot 
depend upon foreign sovereigns to honor the United States' grants of 
immunity.72 Such a result could induce sophisticated criminals to create 
foreign contracts or other associations in order to avoid testifying forever 
in the United States.73 In addition, extension would unduly burden 
American courts with questions of foreign law that they are not qualified 
to handle.74 This burden could have a crippling effect on our criminal 
justice system.75 
Although the Under Seal approach is better reasoned and justified 
than the view represented by Cardassi, the Flanagan compromise ap-
proach76 is better suited to balance the interests of the United States as 
well as those of the witness fearing foreign prosecution. The Flanagan 
compromise approach77 would afford some protection to a witness facing 
foreign prosecution, while at the same time promote the policy that the 
public has a right to every person's evidence.78 This middle alternative 
requires a witness to show a greater-than-ordinary risk of foreign prose-
cution before a court would apply the fifth amendment privilege to a 
foreign prosecution.79 Each witness would be evaluated based on the 
facts of his particular case.80 There would be a presumption against ex-
tending the privilege, and the witness would have the burden of proving 
more than just a reasonable risk of foreign prosecution.81 This approach 
avoids the inadequacy of a per se rule regarding extension of the right 
69. Id. at 366-67. 
70. See Note, The Fifth Amendment Does Not Protect, supra note 67, at 270. 
71. Reach of the Fifth Amendment, supra note 9, at 876. 
72.Id. 
73.Id. 
74. Id. at 897. 
75.Id. 
76. Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 124 .. 
77. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text; see also In re Gilboe, 699 F.2d 71 (2d 
Cir. 1983) (relying on the Flanagan compromise approach). Flanagan has been at-
tacked by one source which claims that it "establishes a standard less compromise 
test that will lead to confusion and uncertainty and that [it] conflicts with [prece-
dent]." See Note, Reach of the Fifth Amendment, supra note 9, at 898. 
78. Note, Reach of the Fifth Amendment, supra note 9 at 890. 
79. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text. 
80.Id. 
81. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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against self-incrimination to foreign prosecutions. The Flanagan ap-
proach is a test that deserves consideration when the Supreme Court is 
ultimately faced with this issue. 
The Under Seal decision represents a well-reasoned position which 
finds some support in the United States Constitution, case law, and pol-
icy. The court, however, should have been more thorough in addressing 
the other approaches to this constitutional issue as well as the ramific-
tions of its holding. The Flanagan compromise approach strikes the ap-
propriate balance between a witness fearing foreign prosecution and 
society's interest in compelling essential testimony by requiring the wit-
ness to demonstrate a greater-than-ordinary risk of foreign prosecution 
before a court would invoke the fifth amendment privilege. Courts ad-
dressing this issue in the future should evaluate Flanagan's compromise 
approach before deciding this important national issue. 
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